We study the business cycle behavior of segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin (e.g., just affecting fixed-term contracts) and ask whether these types of labor markets can display similar cyclical volatility as fully deregulated ones. We present a matching model with temporary and permanent jobs where (i) there is a gap in the firing costs associated with these types of jobs, and (ii) there are restrictions in the creation and duration of fixed-term contracts. We show that the scenario of flexibility at the margin provides an intermediate situation, in terms of unemployment volatility, between fully regulated and fully deregulated labor markets. This analysis yields new insights into the interpretation of the recent volatility changes witnessed in the OECD area.
Introduction
In segmented labor markets, flexibility at the margin is achieved with high protection of "permanent" workers (i.e., those under open-ended contracts) and loose regulation of fixed-term employment. The main objective of this paper is to provide further understanding of the business cycle behavior of segmented labor markets with limitations in the use of fixed-term contracts. In particular, we explore whether this flexibility at the margin is the reason why labor markets with relatively high degree of employment protection may display similar or even higher cyclical volatility than more flexible labor markets.
Evidence in support of this hypothesis is provided in Figure 1 . This shows a change in the relationship between unemployment volatility and the employment protection legislation (EPL) on permanent contracts. More in detail, for different detrending methods, Figures 1a-1b and 1c-1d exhibit a shift from a negative correlation during the period 1970-1990 (-0.28 using the HP filter and -0.11 using the first log-difference) to a positive correlation during the period 1991-2006 (0.55 and 0.47). The latter is in line with the negative relationship documented in Thomas (2006) and Veracierto (2008) in terms of output and employment volatility (rather than unemployment).
The change in this relationship is the result of several phenomena. Among them there is the general fall in business cycle volatility known as the "Great Moderation", with specific features in the Anglo-Saxon and Euro-zone countries (Stock and Watson, 2005 ). In addition, unemployment fluctuations have been magnified by the increasing international capital mobility, especially in the more responsive small economies (Azariadis and Pissarides, 2007). Also, there is an increasing use of temporary contracts after several waves of labor market reforms introduced in many OECD countries. These reforms have affected the relative strictness of EPL on fixed-term and permanent contracts (see Table 2 .A2.6 in OECD, 2004). As a consequence, firms have adapted their hiring and firing policies, and today have different responses to business cycle shocks.
In this context, the aim of this paper is to assess whether these reforms may help ex- 
EPL on permanent contracts
Note: The Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index on permanent contracts is taken from the OECD (2004) . Unemployment volatility is computed as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of seasonally adjusted standardized unemployment rate from OECD Main Economic Indicators. Unemployment is detrended using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 in panels a and b, and using the first log-difference in panels c and d.
plain the change in the relationship between labor market fluctuations and employment protection.
Our hypothesis is that, having the possibility of hiring on a fixed-term basis, firms are using flexibility at the margin as an important mechanism to adjust employment.
Consequently, job creation and job destruction is mainly concentrated in the segment of temporary employment. This would help explain the high volatility in the labor market observed in countries with strict EPL on permanent contracts and a high (or growing)
share of fixed-term jobs.
This hypothesis is somewhat consistent with evidence found by the OECD (2004), which shows that countries that have undertaken EPL reforms (and thus eased the relative strictness of EPL on fixed-term contracts relative to the one on permanent contracts) also have had a more intensive use of temporary work. Table 1 also shows evidence in this direction. In this table, we differentiate between two types of labor markets that broadly characterize many OECD economies. First, we identify the wellknown Anglo-Saxon type. These economies have a small degree of EPL on permanent contracts (PCs), low firing costs, and no limitations on the renewal and duration of temporary contracts (TCs). We denote this type with [NL] . As a consequence of the high flexibility in the regular segment of the market, there is a limited use of temporary contracts. For example, Australia, Ireland, UK and US have a relatively low share of temporary work (5.8%, 6.8%, 6.3% and 4.5%, respectively).
The second type is a labor market with flexibility at the margin, which combines a high degree of employment protection on permanent contracts with limited flexibility in the use of temporary work. We denote this type with [L] in Table 1 . Economies such as Portugal, Sweden, and Spain are among those with the highest EPL index values (4.3, 2.9 and 2.6) and display the highest shares of temporary workers (16.1%, 14.6% and 32.9%).
It is well known that fixed-term employment contracts have been introduced in a number of European countries as a way of providing labor flexibility to economies with high employment protection levels. The implementation of temporary contracts, however, has typically included restrictions such as limited renewals and maximum durations.
1 For example, the Spanish labor market reform in 1984 crucially broadened the scope of fixed-term contracts while, at the same time, restricted to 3 the maximum number of successive contracts with a maximum accumulated duration of 2 years (OECD, 2004). In Portugal, temporary contracts can also be renewed up to 3 times, 1 It is worth noting that countries with firing costs and no limitations on TCs make extensive use of PCs. Temporary contracts can be used for screening or training purposes or just to save on firing costs in case of economic turmoil and need of labor adjustments. Although this deserves further research and understanding, our hypothesis is that flexible labor markets make a larger use of TCs for screening or training purposes than those with flexibility at the margin, which in turn increases the probability of being on a permanent contract (OECD, 2004) . This would imply higher conversion rates from TCs to PCs and, therefore, an extensive use of PCs even in countries with firing costs and no limitations on TCs. At the other extreme, segmented labor markets would have low conversion rates as it has been documented by the OECD (2004).
but with a longer maximum duration of 30 months. These types of contracts seems to provide a great source of labor turnover and, thus, of labor market volatility. For example, unemployment volatilities in Portugal and Sweden are 12.0% and 12.9%, well above those of UK and US (5.3% and 8.5%) in the period 1991-2006. Spain, with 7.2%, falls between these two deregulated countries. In other words, flexibility at the margin may be important in order to explain the quick adjustments and large volatilities observed in some European labor markets that are characteristic of Anglo-Saxon economies. restrictions in the use of temporary contracts. 3 Although not providing a full account of the facts, we find that these are important factors affecting the cyclical volatility observed in segmented labor markets.
Our model provides a stylized representation of a labor market with restrictions on hiring, job conversion, and firing decisions. Regarding hiring and job conversion, we assume regulations preventing (i) all new contracts to be signed on a fixed-term basis, and (ii) unlimited duration of fixed-term contracts. As for firing, temporary and permanent jobs are both subject to firing costs with the former being lower as mentioned before. This set of restrictions generates flexibility at the margin and, as we
show, provides additional mechanisms that affect fluctuations in the labor market.
We calibrate our baseline model to a representative European labor market with restricted flexibility at the margin. Simulations of our benchmark economy show a procyclical behavior of both temporary and permanent jobs and in the share of fixed-3 Another important difference with respect to Sala and Silva (2009) and Costain et al (2010) papers is that in our model firing costs affect only the Nash rule for wage determination in continuing jobs. This distinction is relevant given that the firm does not incur in firing costs if there is not a wage agreement during the first meeting, because a contract has not yet been signed. term contracts. The job finding and job conversion rates are also procyclical. These results are broadly consistent with the cyclical behavior observed in labor markets with limited flexibility in the use of temporary jobs.
We also find that our benchmark scenario of flexibility at the margin provides an intermediate situation, in terms of unemployment volatility, with respect to a fully regulated and a fully deregulated labor market.
4 Therefore, our model is not entirely able to explain why unemployment in most OECD countries with limited flexibility in the use of temporary contracts has become more volatile than in countries with more flexible labor markets such as the Anglo-Saxon type. 5 Moreover, we show that within the scenario of limited flexibility in the use of temporary jobs, (i) an increase in firing costs for either temporary or permanent jobs, and (ii) tighter restrictions in the use of temporary contracts reduce the volatility of unemployment.
The main reason behind the higher unemployment volatility observed in the case of flexibility at the margin with respect to a fully regulated labor market is simple. The lower firing costs for temporary workers allow firms to adjust its employment level more intensively through these types of workers. Moreover, rather than converting fixed-term contracts into permanent ones, which potentially entails future firing costs, firms will let temporary contracts expire and hire new workers under temporary contracts. These two channels generate large fluctuations in the job destruction rate associated with temporary contracts and, as a result, in unemployment.
However, the volatility of the job destruction probability falls with tighter limitations in hiring temporary workers and in the duration of fixed-term contracts. The intuition for this result is that the share of temporary workers falls as restrictions on fixedterm contracts increase. Therefore, employment adjustments in temporary workers become relatively less important. Since these tend to be more responsive to productivity shocks than adjustments in permanent workers, the volatilities of job destruction and, therefore, of unemployment fall.
When flexibility at the margin is suppressed in a scenario of employment protection, most of the unemployment volatility in our model vanishes. This gives rise to a scenario similar to the one before the introduction of labor market reforms in many OECD countries during the 1980-90s when fixed-term employment was much less prevalent.
A final important result we find is the countercyclical behavior of job destruction, both in fully deregulated and flexibility-at-the-margin labor market types. This result clarifies a similar empirical finding for Spain in Messina and Vallanti (2007) , and helps explain why the job turnover rate of some regulated labor markets displays a countercyclical behavior in contrast to the acyclical or even procyclical movements suggested by some studies (Garibaldi, 1998) .
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
In Section 3 we calibrate it to a benchmark labor market representative of an "average"
European one with flexibility at the margin. In Section 4 we simulate our calibrated model and compare the results to an economy with essentially no legal restrictions in the use of temporary contracts, such as the US economy. In Section 5 we verify the robustness of our previous results by simulating additional scenarios of employment protection. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The economy consists of a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers and firms.
We normalize the measure of workers to 1. Workers and firms discount future payoffs at a common rate β. Moreover, capital markets are perfect and time is discrete.
Workers may be either unemployed or employed. Unemployed individuals enjoy an instantaneous utility b each period. Those who are employed can be so either under a temporary or a permanent contract. They can also be new entrants or incumbents.
Thus, there are four types of workers who earn a wage w T 0t , w P 0t , w T t and w P t , where subscript 0 indicates new entrants and superscripts T and P denote temporary and permanent jobs. Each period any worker may be endogenously terminated if the firm chooses to do so, which entails an exogenous firing cost γ T if temporary or γ P if permanent. We assume that γ T < γ P . Exogenous separations may also occur at no cost with probability φ for any type of worker. When an employment relationship is broken, the worker becomes unemployed.
Moreover, each temporary contract expires each period with probability ι. This parameter reflects legal restrictions regarding the use of fixed-term contracts such as limited number of renewals and maximum duration. For instance, a higher ι indicates stringer legal restrictions in the use of temporary contracts. We use this stochastic approach to model the overall duration of fixed-term contracts for simplicity. When this type of contract expires the worker may be either hired under a permanent contract or laid off. That is, firms have the option of offering these workers a permanent contract (which we define as job conversion). Thus, although the expiration probability ι is constant, the job conversion probability is still an endogenous variable. Also notice that if separation occurs in this case, the firm pays no firing costs.
Each firm consists of only one job which is either filled or vacant, and uses only labor as input. If a job is filled, it produces A t z t units of output each period t, where A t and z t represent aggregate and match-specific productivity levels, respectively. Aggregate productivity follows a Markov process whereas z t is independent and identically distributed across firms and time, with cumulative distribution function G(z) and support
When a job is vacant, the firm searches for an unemployed worker to fill the position at a constant cost c per period. Search frictions in the labor market are captured by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function m(u t , v t ), where u t denotes the unemployment rate and v t is the vacancy rate in period t. We follow den Haan et al. (2000) and
This functional form ensures that the ratios m(u t , v t )/u t and m(u t , v t )/v t lie between 0 and 1. The former represents the probability that an unemployed worker meets a vacant job, which we write as f (θ t ) = m(1, θ t ), where θ t = v t /u t . The latter denotes the probability at which vacancies meet workers, q(θ t ) = m(1/θ t , 1). This matching function also implies that the higher the number of vacancies with respect to the number of unemployed workers (i.e., larger θ), the easier to find a job and the more difficult to fill up vacancies.
Job creation takes place when an unemployed worker meets a vacant job and they agree on an employment contract. When there is a meeting, a match-specific productivity z t is drawn. If the match is profitable, the firm hires the worker. With no restrictions, a firm would always offer a temporary contract due to our assumptions about separation costs. Namely, γ T < γ P and no separation costs associated with the expiration of temporary contracts. We assume, however, that with probability α the firm is bound to offer a temporary contract if it chooses to hire the worker as in Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002). This is a policy parameter reflecting restrictions on hiring.
Within a period, the timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each period unemployed workers and vacancies meet. At the same time, all existing matches (i.e., those who produced last period) learn whether they break exogenously with probability φ. Right after that, surviving temporary matches realize whether their contracts expire according to probability ι. Afterwards, each match (old and new) draws an idiosyncratic productivity z t , and aggregate productivity A t is realized. If z t is sufficiently large and, consequently, the match has a positive surplus, production takes place. Otherwise, the firm either breaks the existing employment relationship or does not offer a contract to the new entrant. Moreover, it may choose to open a vacancy and search for a new worker next period. Accordingly, the value of vacancies V t , and filled positions,
and J P t (z t ), are represented by the following Bellman equations,
where z j 0 and z j , j = T, P , are productivity thresholds defined such that nonprofitable matches (i.e., with negative surplus) are severed. 7 Thus, the conditions defining these thresholds for job creation and destruction are:
The first two expressions (7) and (8) are job creation conditions for temporary and 7 Since the value of a match is increasing in z t , we can prove that there exists a threshold z t ∈ [0,z] below which matches are no longer profitable. permanent jobs, respectively. Note that in those cases the firm is not liable to pay γ T or γ P in the absence of agreement. Thus, unemployed workers find temporary and permanent jobs with probabilities
Recall that when a firm and a worker meet they can only agree on a temporary contract with probability α. Finally, the (unconditional) job finding probability is simply
Notice that condition (8) also defines the threshold for temporary-to-permanent conversions. Thus, temporary employees become permanent with the following job conversion probability
Equations (9) and (10) set the reservation productivity for current temporary and permanent workers. Therefore, these two conditions, together with (8), characterize endogenous job destruction. 8 It follows that temporary and permanent matches separate with probabilities
and the total job destruction probability is
8 Recall that firms may avoid temporary-to-permanent conversions when fixed-term contracts expire. Therefore, job destruction also depends on condition (8) .
where n T t and n P t are the mass of temporary and permanent workers in period t. That is, those who actually are in productive matches that period.
From the worker's perspective, the values of being unemployed U t , and employed,
, are expressed as follows,
We also assume that there is free entry for firms. Hence firms open vacancies until the expected value of doing so becomes zero. Therefore, in equilibrium:
Furthermore, because neither workers nor employers can instantaneously find an alternative match partner in the labor market, and because hiring and firing decisions are costly, a match surplus exists. To divide this surplus we assume wages to be the result of bilateral Nash bargaining between workers and firms. They are revised every period upon the occurrence of new shocks, and the Nash solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product of the workers' and the firms' net return from the job match. The first-order conditions for the temporary and permanent employees yield the following four equations:
where η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the workers' bargaining power relative to firms. Note that the last two Nash conditions present terms depending on γ T and γ P . Because separation costs are operational, they are explicitly considered in the wage negotiation. This implies that the firms' threat point when negotiating with a worker is no longer the value of a vacancy V t but (V t − γ T ) or (V t − γ P ) depending on the type of worker. This is not the case for entrant workers. If the firm and the new entrant cannot agree on a wage and therefore an employment relationship is not established, the firm is not liable for firing costs. This is why γ T and γ P do not appear in the first two Nash conditions.
By substituting the Bellman equations (3)- (6) and (19)- (22) into the respective first-order conditions (24)- (27) and solving for the wages, we obtain
For a given level of productivity, the wages of continuing temporary and permanent workers, w T t (z t ) and w P t (z t ), are higher than the new entry wages, w T 0t (z t ) and w
in each case. This result takes place because γ T and γ P become operational once the new entry wages are renegotiated, which in turn rise the implicit bargaining power of continuing employees.
To fully characterize the dynamics of the model economy, we need to define the law of motion for the unemployment rate u t , and the mass of temporary and permanent workers, n T t and n P t . These evolve according to the following difference equations,
with u t + n
Finally, aggregate output Y t is equal to
Calibration
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency in order to match seven targets that characterize a representative European labor market with limited flexibility in the use of fixed-term contracts. Our benchmark parametrization is summarized in Table 2 .
The first two targets are an average unemployment rate of 8.4% and an average share of temporary workers on total dependent employment of 14.4% during the period 1991-2006 (Table 1) . Thus, we target u ss = 0.084 and This monthly rate implies a quarterly job finding probability χ ss of 0.283. 9 We also target a quarterly job finding probability χ Our next target pins down firing costs for permanent contracts. We rely on several sources. Based on the World Bank's Doing Business survey and its detailed study of EPL in many countries, we take an average firing costs associated with permanent contracts in economies with limited flexibility equal to 34.8 weeks of weekly wages (see Table 1 ). Moreover, according to Garibaldi and Violante (2005) , the ratio of firing tax over total firing costs is between around 0.35 (when worker and firm reach no off-court agreement) and 0.20 (when there is a 50% probability of reaching such agreement)
in Italy. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed information for other countries with limited flexibility. Since court dismissals are frequently used in some European countries such as France and Spain (see Güell, 2010 , for a discussion), we take the first of these two scenarios and set this firing tax ratio to 0.35. Thus, the firing tax component of permanent jobs amounts to γ P = 34.8 × (w P ss /12) × 0.35 = 1.015w P ss . 11 Regarding firing costs for temporary contracts, not only these are considerably lower than for permanent contracts, but they can also be avoided by letting these contracts expire. Hence, we assume no effective firing tax on temporary jobs and set γ T = 0.
Our final target is an elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment of 0.6. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) find that this elasticity is in the range 0.5-0.7.
The logarithm of the aggregate labor productivity A t follows an AR(1) process log A t = ρ log A t−1 + t , with t ∼ N (0, σ ). The values of the autoregressive parameter ρ and the standard deviation of the white noise process σ are calibrated to match the average standard deviation (0.009) and autocorrelation (0.7) of the cyclical component 10 In this case, the probability of finding a job with a permanent contract within a quarter equals [1 − (1 − 0.137) (1/4) ] = 0.036. 11 We divide w P ss by 12 to obtain the weekly wage. Standard deviation for the distribution of log z σ z 0.2
Workers' bargaining power η 0.5
Expiration probability of a temporary contract ι 0.0936
Parameter of the matching function ϕ 0.424
Firing tax of permanent contracts γ P 1.0466
Firing tax of temporary contracts γ
Exogenous separation probability φ 0.0182
Hiring probability of a temporary contract α 0.87
Persistence parameter of A ρ 0.674
Standard deviation of σ 0.00684
Hiring costs c 0.0169
Employment opportunity cost b 0.9687
[A] Other studies or own assumptions as explained in main text.
[B] Set to match the cyclical volatility and persistence of labor productivity in economies with limited flexibility.
[C] Set to match our seven targets.
of labor productivity, Y t /(1 − u t ). 12 Thus, we set ρ = 0.674 and σ = 0.00684.
The logarithm of the idiosyncratic productivity z t is assumed to be N (0, σ z ) as in We set the quarterly discount rate β to 0.99, and the bargaining parameter η to 0.5.
Finally, the firing tax parameter of permanent contracts, γ P , the parameter of the matching function, ϕ, the vacancy cost parameter, c, the exogenous separation probability, φ, the conversion contract probability, ι, the exogenous hiring probability of a new temporary job, α, and the employment opportunity cost, b, are calibrated to match our seven targets. This yields γ P = 1.0466, ϕ = 0.424, c = 0.0169, φ = 0.0182, ι = 0.0936, α = 0.8702, and b = 0.9687.
12 Data on labor productivity for each country with limited flexibility is taken from the OECD's Main Economic Indicators Database. It is reported as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1,600.
The calibrated steady-state values (first row in Table 3) Table 1 ).
Simulations
The model is solved by a first-order log-linearization procedure implemented in Dynare for Matlab. This program also simulates the model and computes the steady state and business cycle statistics.
13 Table 3 summarizes the results from our benchmark simulation with limited flexibility.
Our simulated model generates a standard deviation of unemployment of 0.062, which is about 2/3 of the average for countries with flexibility at the margin in Table   1 . Another salient result is that we match the observed behavior of some other relevant variables such as employment (both temporary and permanent), the share of fixed-term employment, and the job conversion probability. In countries with limited flexibility like Spain (see Sala and Silva, 2009 ) temporary employment is more volatile and procyclical than permanent employment. Moreover, both the job conversion probability ζ and the share of fixed-term contracts are procyclical in our simulations. This is also the case in countries with limited flexibility in the use of temporary contracts.
Although not perfect, our calibrated model provides an accurate picture of what can be thought as a representative European labor market with flexibility at the margin.
Of course, it cannot be specifically associated with a particular country, but it provides, in broad terms, an appropriate benchmark for assessing the impact of different labor market reforms on the volatility of the unemployment rate. This is done in Section Table 4 together with the relevant data for the US (the sole flexible country in Table 1 with zero firing costs).
14 Shimer (2005) estimates a monthly job finding probability of 0.45, which implies a quarterly probability of 1 − (1 − 0.45) 3 ] = 0.83. Thus, we also target χ ss = 0.83. We detrend the quarterly data using the HP filter with smoothing parameter 1600.
Notice that the simulated standard deviation of unemployment under full flexibility (0.106) is only 18% higher than the observed one in the US labor market (0.090). Also, the simulated correlations between unemployment, the job finding, and job destruction probabilities are consistent with those in the data. The model, however, overestimates the volatility of the job destruction probability (0.10 vs. 0.042) and underestimates the volatility of the job finding probability (0.019 vs. 0.059).
When we compare both simulated economies, the most important result is that the unemployment volatility with no employment protection (0.106) is 71% higher than the one representative of limited flexibility (0.062). This is in contrast with the data.
Recall that the average standard deviation for countries with limited flexibility is 0.092 whereas in the US it is slightly lower. This implies that, on their own, restrictions affecting the use of temporary work as well as EPL on permanent employment do not push high enough the volatility of our flexibility-at-the-margin labor market. In this context, the relevant question is how flexible our benchmark (dual) labor market should be in order to display a similar volatility of a fully deregulated economy. Section 5 is devoted to this issue.
Assessing the impact of EPL changes
Here we simulate our model with flexibility at the margin under different scenarios.
These scenarios may be interpreted as describing labor market reforms consisting on changes in legislation that shift four crucial parameters governing hiring and firing decisions in our model: α, ι, γ T , and γ P . The departing point is our baseline Europeanlike economy as presented in the previous two sections, which we modify in the following ways:
Scenario 1: For given levels of restrictions on temporary work (i.e., α and ι), we lower firing costs for permanent jobs. In particular, we set
Scenario 2: Given α and ι, firing costs for temporary jobs increase to
Since now γ T > 0, firms are bound to pay firing costs for fixed-term contracts provided the employment relationship terminates before it expires.
Scenario 3: Given ι, and separation costs, we consider more restrictions to hire a temporary worker by lowering α to 0.2.
Scenario 4:
Given α and separation costs, we increase the expiration probability of temporary contracts. Thus, we set ι = 1, which implies that the average duration of a temporary worker is one quarter.
Scenario 5:
Here we consider a fully regulated labor market with employment protection and no fixed-term contracts. This attempts to mimic several OECD economies before labor market reforms in the 1980-90s. A paradigmatic case is Spain before its 1984 labor market reform. In terms of the model, this means that firms are no longer able to hire temporary workers. Thus, we set α = 0. Moreover, γ P = γ > 0, and both ι and γ T become irrelevant.
Next we describe the steady-sate effects of these EPL changes. Then, we simulate each of the above scenarios and assess their impact on the cyclical volatility of labor market variables.
Steady state results
The main finding of this exercise is that the bulk of the impact of changes in employment protection on unemployment takes place through the job destruction margin (see Table 5 ). Notice that the job finding probability χ remains virtually unchanged across scenarios. The job destruction rate λ declines when there are more restrictions in the creation of fixed-term employment -i.e., higher α as in scenario 3 -and when the probability of expiration of temporary contracts ι increases as in scenario 4. Moreover, the higher the firing costs for either temporary or permanent contracts, the lower λ (see scenarios 1, 2, and 5). As a result, unemployment falls with increasing separation costs as well as more restrictions on temporary work. Güell (2010) argues that both theoretical models and empirical studies lead to ambiguous results when analyzing the effect of firing costs on aggregate employment. As she says, "the overall effects of firing costs depend on whether these reduce more the flows to or from unemployment" (p.7).
In our case, the decline in the flows to unemployment clearly dominates.
The response of job destruction in a scenario of employment protection and no temporary contracts (scenario 5) is a well-known result in the literature. The higher the firing costs, the more expensive it becomes to shed workers, and the lower the job destruction probability λ. In our case, when firing costs rise from 20% to 101.5% of the average wage, λ drops from 1.88% to 1.82%.
In scenario 1, we find that a reduction of firing costs to 20% of the average wage of permanent workers causes λ to increase from 2.60% in our benchmark case to 2.74%.
Notice that this is the result of more separations of permanent workers because the job destruction probability of temporary contracts remains essentially unchanged (7.20% vs. 7.22%). Thus, the share of temporary contracts n T /(1 − u) increases from 14.4% to 15.2%, and unemployment slightly goes up 0.4 percentage points.
In scenario 2, the introduction of firing costs for temporary jobs has a significant negative impact on λ T which falls from 7.20% to 2.36%. For this size of firing costs, firms do not destroy temporary jobs (i.e., G( z T t+1 ) = 0) before they expire. In other words, firms let all fixed-term contracts run out, at which point separations do not entail firing costs. As a result, the share of temporary workers slightly increase to 15%, and the job destruction probability falls to 1.9%. Consequently, unemployment decreases 2 percentage points.
In scenario 3, when firms find more difficult to hire a worker under a fixed-term contract (lower α), the share of temporary contracts goes down significantly to 2.6%.
Moreover, firms destroy temporary jobs at a lower rate as the fall in λ T indicates. These two effects push λ and unemployment down.
In scenario 4, a higher expiration probability of temporary contracts ι increases the destruction probability of temporary jobs in order to avoid transitions to a permanent status, which implies possible firing costs in the future. Thus, λ T increases from 7.20% to 7.67%. The overall job destruction probability, however, falls because of the large drop in the the share of temporary workers to 1.7%.
A further result, not reported in Table 5 , is the absence of endogenous job destruction of permanent jobs whenever γ P w P ss is greater than 0.2. Intuitively, this implies that firms will choose to keep their permanent workers to avoid incurring in high separation costs. Analytically, this is equivalent to a situation where separations become exogenous to firms' decisions.
Business cycle results
We now discuss the impact of EPL changes on the cyclical volatility of the labor market. Table 6 presents the results.
The first main result is that stricter labor market legislation (i.e., larger firing costs, higher ι, or lower α) increases the volatility of the job finding probability χ because job creation becomes more sensitive to productivity shocks. The quantitative effect, however, seems to be small.
Moreover, more stringent EPL lowers the volatility of the aggregate job separation rate λ. This effect is especially significant in a fully regulated labor market (scenario 5),
where firms cannot use temporary contracts. In this case, sufficiently high firing costs eliminates the volatility of the job destruction rate. This negative relationship between firing costs and the job destruction rate is also found by Garibaldi (1998) and Thomas (2007) . Their basic intuition is that the higher the firing costs, the more expensive it becomes to shed workers, in which case the job destruction rate becomes less sensitive to shocks. In the case of flexibility at the margin (scenarios 1 and 2), the volatility of λ is also inversely related to firing costs essentially because of the same reason.
In scenarios 3 and 4, where there are more restrictions on temporary jobs, the volatility of λ sharply falls from 6.02 in the benchmark scenario to 1.27 and 1.08. This result takes place because the share of temporary jobs falls as restrictions on fixed-term contracts increase. Therefore, employment adjustments in temporary workers become relatively less important. Since permanent employment tend to be less responsive to productivity shocks than temporary jobs, the volatility of job destruction falls.
One conclusion we can draw from our simulation results is that a more stringent legislation on temporary jobs makes firms relatively more prone to adjust vacancies rather than to destroy jobs in response to productivity shocks.
Another result concerns the response of unemployment, which depends on whether the fall in the volatility of separations exceeds the increase in the volatility of the job finding rate. Note that in our analysis it does. Therefore, the volatility of unemployment declines with higher firing costs. Under a scenario of flexibility at the margin we find that an increase in firing costs for permanent jobs from 20% to 101.5% of their average wage causes the unemployment volatility to drop from 7.33 in scenario 1 to 6.16 in the benchmark case. Similarly, when firing costs for temporary contracts increase from 0 to 75% of the corresponding average wage in scenario 2, it falls to 3.23. Moreover, in our scenario 5 of employment protection and no temporary contracts, when firing costs rise from 20% to 101.5% of the average wage, it decreases from 3.68 to 2.66.
The volatility of unemployment also declines when there are more restrictions in the creation of fixed-term employment -i.e., higher α as in scenario 3 -and when the probability of expiration of temporary contracts ι increases as in scenario 4.
When the economy changes from a scenario with strict employment protection (firing costs at 101.5% of the average wage) and no segmentation (scenario 5), to a scenario where firms may use fixed-term contracts not subject to firing costs (benchmark scenario), the unemployment volatility increases from 2.66 to 6. 
Employment protection and simulated correlations
Messina and Vallanti (2007) have recently examined the impact of firing restrictions on job flow dynamics. They provide evidence that firms with tight firing restrictions smooth job destruction over the business cycle so that job turnover becomes less countercyclical. This result is in line with previous studies that suggest an acyclical behavior of labor flows in continental Europe in contrast to their countercyclical pattern in AngloSaxon countries (see Garibaldi, 1998) . They also find, however, empirical evidence suggesting that the presence of temporary contracts may revert the acyclical behavior of the job destruction rate. This possibility is what we explore next. In particular, we ask our model to what extent the coexistence of EPL on permanent contracts with flexibility at the margin has an impact on the cyclical behavior of the separation rate λ t as well as the job finding probability χ t . We measure this effect through the correlation between these variables and the business cycle. The answer is provided in Table 7 where we distinguish three stylized cases: (i) a fully deregulated market, where γ T = γ P = 0 (corresponding to Table 4 ); (ii) a fully regulated market with no temporary jobs, where Table 6 ); and (iii) a regulated market with restricted flexibility at the margin, where α = 0.87, ι = 0.0936, γ T = 0, and γ P /w P ss = 1.015 (our benchmark case).
It is interesting to observe that in the first case, which we associate with the AngloSaxon type labor market, there is an almost perfect negative correlation between the job separation rate and the business cycle (-0.999). Also noteworthy is the acyclical relationship obtained in a regulated market with no flexibility at the margin. This is commonly associated with some continental European labor markets, as in Garibaldi (1998). The added value of this exercise, however, lies in the third case, where the use of fixed-term contracts is restricted. We associate this case with the flexibility-atthe-margin type of labor market defined in the introduction. As shown in Table 7 , the negative correlation between the job destruction rate and the business cycle (-0.990) resembles that of a fully deregulated labor market (see Sala and Silva, 2009 , for the Spanish case, where it attains -0.26).
Conclusions
Flexibility at the margin is achieved in segmented labor markets with high protection of permanent workers and loose regulation of fixed-term employment. Does this type of flexibility warrant similar cyclical volatility as in fully flexible labor markets? Does it explain the recent change witnessed in the OECD area in the correlation between employment protection legislation and unemployment? In this paper we explore whether, and to what extent, flexibility at the margin is helpful in answering these questions.
We develop a matching model with heterogenous workers (regular and fixed-term employees) and focus our analysis on a twofold dimension of segmented labor markets.
First, on the effects that the gap in firing costs among these two type of workers has on the volatility of the labor market. Second, on the additional effects that arise from restricting the creation and duration of fixed-term contracts.
Our model is calibrated to a stylized economy representative of a European labor market with flexibility at the margin and limitations in the use of temporary employment. This benchmark economy is then used to examine the consequences of EPL changes affecting the main parameters governing the firm's hiring and firing decisions.
We find that our benchmark scenario of flexibility at the margin increases the volatility of unemployment relative to a fully regulated labor market with strict EPL and no temporary contracts. Our simulation exercises show, however, that our model with limited flexibility in the use of temporary contracts cannot generate unemployment volatility of the same magnitude as an economy with a fully flexible labor market. Moreover, our simulations reveal that higher firing costs in either temporary or permanent jobs as well as more stringent restrictions in the use of fixed-term contracts reduce the volatility of unemployment.
In short, on its own, our model is not able to fully explain why most of the OECD countries' labor markets with limited flexibility in the use of temporary contracts have become more volatile than those of countries with flexible labor markets. This leads us to the conclusion that this is not the whole story and other forces may be at work.
One alternative is to consider other factors that improve workers' bargaining power.
For example, the degree of unionization or collective wage bargaining, which would fit in our distinction between flexible and dual labor markets. Another possibility is to explore the fact that, as it is by now well documented, flexibility at the margin not only produces a gap in separation costs between temporary and permanent workers but also leads to a productivity gap because of the high turnover and lack of on-the-job by Sala and Silva (2009) , these productivity differences make temporary workers more vulnerable to productivity shocks, which increases the volatility of unemployment.
A final important result is the almost perfect negative correlation we find between job destruction and the business cycle both in the Anglo-Saxon and the flexibility at the margin labor market types. This result clarifies the analogous finding for Spain in Messina and Vallanti (2007) , which could not be confirmed for the rest of the countries in the context of their analysis. Our paper, in fact, provides the rationale for such finding.
